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It is often argued that even if life is ‘absurd’ and that consequently there is no way to live 
it that has value and point, there is nevertheless a value and point in examining life and 
facing up to the truth that life is absurd and then live honestly in the light of that truth. 
This however is inconsistent. It may indeed be argued that, if life is valueless and 
pointless, then the unexamined life that by whatever means makes life as palatable as 
possible is no better or worse than anything other. Yet we balk at accepting such an 
inauthentic way of living. 
_______________________________________ 
 
This paper is not about truth but about consistency. Pointing to inconsistency would be a 
dry worthless exercise were there not people who are inconsistent in the specific way 
described and for whom such inconsistency matters. There are those who tell us that life 
has no value and is pointless, that it is ‘absurd’, and yet that it matters how we live our 
lives; in particular that we ought to square up to the truth that life has no value and is 
pointless. Philosophy and art, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have 
often seen this view in the ascendant when they get onto the issue of ‘the meaning of 
life’. 
If life is pointless, and everything we do without value, then there can be no more 
value in a life that faces up to that truth than in one that doesn’t. To argue otherwise 
would be to argue that although nothing has value and no way of living has more value 
than any other, yet to live an authentic life that faces this truth is a better way of living 
than an inauthentic way that does not; perhaps because the former is more rational and 
we should value having rationally-shaped honest lives, and the latter would be 
intellectual cowardice. But this is clearly inconsistent. One cannot deny all life having 
value and also suppose a residue of value entailed by saying that living in awareness of 
the valuelessness of life is a superior way to live. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with 
getting through life in a manner that minimises the feeling of distress caused by the 
thought that life is pointless and meaningless, and so arrange things (psychologically and 
practically) that one ends up as far as one is able living life as if life has a point and is 
valuable. Yet many would regard this as heinous and would berate others for living in 
this way. 
The argument has something in common with Pascal’s Wager - but only so far. It 
isn’t susceptible to the criticism Bertrand Russell directed at the Wager, that it was a 
terrible piece of cowardly intellectual dishonesty. For that to work, it has to be bad to be 
cowardly and intellectually dishonest. Now one could claim that in the case of Pascal’s 
Wager, because the argument itself allows the notion of the value of intellectual honesty 
to stand, Russell has a good point, even if the value of such intellectual honesty might 
have to be weighed against the value of perhaps avoiding damnation. But my argument is 
that if all values are spurious, then there is no greater value in facing up to the truth than 
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not. If there are no values and there is no point to life, and there is no particular way to 
live your live that is better than any other, then intellectual dishonesty and cowardice 
don’t matter either. 
The argument is not meant to persuade anyone whether life has value or not. If it 
does have value, then we can find out what it is, perhaps. If it doesn’t have value, then it 
doesn’t matter how we live our lives, and living life in a way that ultimately doesn’t care 
whether life has value or not is as good as any other way. If it seems to have value, then 
that’s just fine, even if it doesn’t. We shouldn’t be berated for living that way. Whatever 
‘gets you through’ is all right. Life cannot have no value and be pointless, and it also 
matter, for some evaluative reason, that we make efforts through examining it to find that 
fact out and then live heroically under the shadow of its truth. You can’t have it both 
ways. 
There is indeed worse to follow. Not only might we conclude that the unexamined 
life is ‘worth living’ because that way one may get through it accepting falsehoods that 
make it seem worth living, but also we may oppose examining our lives because to do so 
would carry the danger of revealing that life is valueless and pointless, and once this is 
grasped, there would be no going back to the happy comforting illusions that made life 
tolerable. If one thinks that life is valueless and pointless, or hard to show not to be so, 
then one should perhaps encourage people not to examine guiding beliefs that would give 
their life meaning, and let them live by their illusions, their falsehoods, perhaps even their 
self-delusions, if it makes life more bearable, perhaps even benign. This of course would 
not be because such a life would be ‘better’ in an evaluative sense; but there is no reason 
to suggest, if life is valueless and pointless, that such a life is any worse than any other 
except, at best, in a pragmatic sense. 
A final disturbing thought. If the argument here is sound, then why does its 
conclusion seem wrong? We tend to think overridingly that it must matter how we live 
our lives in the evaluative sense regardless of whether life is valueless and pointless - 
‘absurd’- or not. 
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